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In order to deter undesirable behavior by individuals and ﬁrms, legal systems
delegate powers to sanction upon diﬀerent decision-making bodies, Regula-
tory Agencies and Courts as paramount examples. Though clearly distinct
in nature and procedure, both Agencies and Courts frequently rely on similar
instruments to sanction the same or very similar kinds of illegal behavior.
Agencies operating in certain areas -environmental protection, work-
place safety and health, banking and ﬁnancial intermediation, transport
safety, just to cite a few- commonly have authority to assess and collect
monetary penalties for regulatory violations detected within their statutory
mandate. For instance, EPA can impose penalties up to $10,000 per day,
with a maximum of $125,0001 on anyone discharging pollutants into a river
in violation of the Clean Water Act.
In turn, many of those regulatory violations are also held criminal oﬀenses2,
and consequently, subject to criminal punishment -in the form of ﬁnes and/or
imprisonment-. Punishment which will be, naturally, decided and enforced
by the Courts. For instance, the knowing discharge of pollutants into navi-
gable waters is a felony punishable by ﬁne of $5,000 to $50,000 per day, and
by imprisonment of up to 3 years.3 It is true that, for a criminal conviction
to take place, the underlying behavior has ordinarily to be qualiﬁed in terms
of the state of mind of the oﬀender -needs to be willful, in most cases4-,
1Sec. 1319(g), Clean Water Act. The maximum size of the penalty is dependent on the
type of procedure -with or without adjudicatory hearings- followed by the Agency. The
amount shown in the text is the upper limit given that hearings have been conducted.
2In what follows, we will disregard the distinction -relevant in American Law for the
proof of evil intent, and for the result qualiﬁcations of the violation- between statutory and
common law crimes. We will assume throughout the paper that the regulatory violation
is considered a crime in the relevant Statute. The distinction is unknown in Europe due
to the strict “legality principle” governing criminal law.
3Sec. 1319(c), Clean Water Act. A simply negligent discharge is also punishable as a
crime, though less severely.
4The willfulness requirement is common, but not necessary, as the previous footnote
shows. Even if unnecessary for criminal punishment as such, it increases the size of the
sanction. In the ﬁeld of environmental crimes there has been substantial debate concerning
the required state of mind of the oﬀender -what a knowing violation means-. See Percival
et al. (2000).
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in a certain area, thus, does not exactly match -that is, is larger than- the
universe of criminal oﬀenses in that same area. What is important, though,
is that for a signiﬁcant fraction of regulatory violations, in addition to the
penalties imposed by the relevant Regulatory Agency, criminal law provides
for a second sanction that will be imposed by the Courts.
This prevalent and, at ﬁrst sight, puzzling feature of most regulatory
and legal systems has remained largely unnoticed in the literature.6 To our
knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to oﬀer a rigorous economic the-
ory of the combined use of regulatory penalties and criminal sanctions to
deter the same underlying illegal behavior. We explore the reasons for the
preference of one over the other as well as possible rationales for using both
sets of sanctions. We show that, apart from the obvious case in which the
regulatory ﬁne cannot be optimal due to the wealth constraint of the oﬀender
and, thus, imprisonment is required for deterrence7, the possibility of legal
error and collusion between the Agency and the oﬀender might, under certain
limited conditions, justify the observed legal dichotomy, and the imposition
of a criminal sanction on top of a regulatory penalty.
Our model follows the standard law enforcement literature (Garoupa
1997, Polinsky and Shavell 2000). We consider the possibility that each
oﬀender can be sanctioned by a Regulatory Agency and by the Courts. The
regulatory penalty and the criminal sanction are both monetary ﬁnes. Given
socially optimal enforcement eﬀort, we argue that it is more eﬀective to ﬁne
oﬀenders by a Regulatory Agency rather than by the Courts. The rationale
for this result is that a regulatory penalty is less costly and entails a higher
probability of eﬀective sanction for the oﬀender, due to a lower burden of
5Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, to be punishable as a crime, the regula-
tory violation has to result in death of a person, or in interference with OSHA inspections
or activities -false reports, etc-.
6Even among the legal commentators, the attention devoted to this apparent dupli-
cation of sanctions has been remarkably scarce. Only its relevance for the scope of the
Double Jeopardy clause (on which more below), has been considered. But even with re-
gard to the cases in which Double Jeopardy was the issue, discussions have shown little
theoretical thrust.
7This is just a special case of the more general rationale for using imprisonment as
punishment. See Polinsky and Shavell (1984, 2000).
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Nevertheless, when, for whatever reason, the socially optimal level of
enforcement eﬀort is not achievable by a Regulatory Agency, there is a pos-
sibility that a criminal sanction could play a role at controlling regulatory
under-enforcement.
We extend our analysis by considering imprisonment sentences (section
three), legal error (section four), and collusion between a Regulatory Agency
and an oﬀender (section ﬁve). Regulatory penalties become less appealing
in these contexts.
Monetary ﬁnes are limited by wealth. Thus, an imprisonment sentence
(or any other form of nonmonetary sanction) could be required to achieve
optimal deterrence. A Regulatory Agency cannot impose an imprisonment
sentence. Consequently, a criminal sanction is needed.
When we consider the possibility of legal error (convicting the innocent),
a higher probability of eﬀective sanction by the Regulatory Agency causes
two problems. First, deterrence is reduced because the opportunity cost of
becoming an oﬀender is smaller (since an honest individual can be detected
and sanctioned). The deterrence advantage exhibited by regulatory penalties
does not necessarily hold when there is the possibility of legal error. Second,
even for purely monetary sanctions, there might be a social cost of punishing
the innocent, of miscarriage of justice: the unjustly sanctioned loose reputa-
tion and the citizenship to some extent demoralizes. It is clear to us, though,
that given there has been a legal error, the social costs from criminal sanction
exceed those from the regulatory penalty. However, since it is more likely
that a Regulatory Agency sanctions the innocent than a Court of Law, the
expected social cost of miscarriage of justice could be higher in the ﬁrst than
in the second case.
When the regulatory penalty is larger than the reward collected by the
Agency, there is the possibility of collusion. If collusion takes place, the
penalty suﬀered by oﬀenders is too low (since the bribe will be less than
what the regulatory penalty should be). Deterrence is reduced. A criminal
sanction should be introduced to oﬀset this eﬀect.
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Agency equals the regulatory penalty to eliminate the possibility of collusion.
Thus, the reward collected by the Agency is larger than the socially optimal
reward (since this one is less than the regulatory penalty). An implication
of this observation is that there will be over-enforcement by the Regulatory
Agency. By introducing a criminal sanction, more individuals are deterred.
If more individuals are deterred, the total reward collected by the Agency is
reduced (because there are fewer oﬀenders), and so the Agency will reduce
enforcement.
Criminal prosecution of regulatory oﬀenses generates information that
is helpful to the Agency’s watchdog. It makes detection of collusion or un-
lawful behavior by the Agency easier to detect and sanction. In other words,
a Regulatory Agency will be more deterred from engaging in collusion if
regulatory oﬀenses can be criminally prosecuted (since there is a higher like-
lihood of detection of collusion). In a similar context, Jost (1997) has argued
that the possibility that oﬀenders can appeal to a Court of Law after being
penalized by a Regulatory Agency increases monitoring costs (because the
appeal makes regulatory enforcement more costly since the Agency has to
investigate the same oﬀense twice). The positive eﬀect is that an Agency will
perform a better job to avoid appeals.
The objective of the paper, though, is not limited to the determination of
the theoretical conditions that can make the use of both sanctioning schemes
optimal. Our analysis is also relevant to the application of a speciﬁc legal
doctrine, the Double Jeopardy clause. Most western legal systems recognize,
from time immemorial, the principle known as Non bis in idem or Ne bis in
idem in the Continental European legal tradition, and as Double Jeopardy
in the US. The principle, simply stated, guarantees that no one should be
punished twice for the same oﬀence. This protection against double or mul-
tiple punishment has explicit recognition at the Constitutional level in some
countries (US, Germany), whereas in others the Courts have acknowledged
its standing as an implicit Constitutional right (Italy, Spain).
The Double Jeopardy clause8 will be violated if the penalties imposed
8Double Jeopardy presents other implications that do not touch the object of this paper.
For instance, in the US the Supreme Court has ruled that it determines asymmetric appeal
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for the purposes of the scope of the Non bis in idem principle. The impo-
sition of penalties by the Agency, then, would bar any criminal conviction
and sanction, and vice versa. The US Supreme Court9 and other Constitu-
tional Courts10 have been struggling with this issue, and alternating between
granting or denying Double Jeopardy protection in these -highly likely, in
terms of occurrence- circumstances. Our analysis, we believe, sheds new
light upon the meaning of Double Jeopardy in this context and points out
at some factors that Courts should look at when deciding the scope of the
Double Jeopardy clause with respect to -nominally, at least-. non-criminal
sanctions.
In many circumstances, regulatory penalties are also coupled with civil
penalties.11 Our analysis conceptually applies with respect to the optimality
of regulatory penalties and civil penalties. However, one should emphasize
that a regulatory penalty’s advantage in deterrence is less evident because
the burden of proof for a civil penalty is no longer reasonable doubt, but
preponderance of the evidence, and mental states are less important. Yet, a
civil case is usually more expensive and more time consuming than regulatory
hearings.
2 Basic Model
As in the usual Polinsky and Shavell (2000) framework, we start by assuming
that each risk-neutral individual chooses whether to commit an oﬀense, for
example, an environmental regulation violation. The oﬀender’s gain from
committing the oﬀense is b, which is distributed across the population ac-
cording to a probability density function g(b) and a cumulative distribution
rights for the prosecution and the defense in criminal cases. See for example Khanna
(1999). In Continental Europe, it does not imply diﬀerentiated appeal rights, but has
other procedural consequences (prevents an Agency from intervening in any way in a case
that is being investigated by a Judge).
9US v. Halper (1987), US v. Ursery (1996), Hudson v. US (1997).
10Spanish Constitutional Court, Sentencia xxx/1999, dated of 11th October 1999.
11For example, sec. 1319, Clean Water Act.
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riving beneﬁts less than b from the crime is G(b). The size of the population
is normalized to one.
Each oﬀense generates a social damage given by h. The net social harm
from the crime is hb (we take the usual view that the illegal gain is a social
gain), where h < b.
The enforcement or Regulatory Agency invests m on investigating and
monitoring individuals and gathering evidence about the act committed by
an oﬀender. Each oﬀender is detected and sanctioned by the Regulatory
Agency with probability p(m). Oﬀenders can also be brought before Court
and convicted with probability q(m), where p(m) > q(m), pm > qm > 0,
pmm < 0 and qmm < 0. Most of these assumptions are self-explanatory.
Given the Agency’s enforcement eﬀort, the probability of conviction by the
Regulatory Agency is higher than that by a Court because (a) costs are lower
for the Regulatory Agency than for the Courts (the sanctioning procedure of
the Regulatory Agency is speedier and cheaper than a criminal trial), (b) the
burden of proof is lower for imposing a regulatory penalty than for a criminal
conviction in Court (“beyond reasonable doubt” would be the burden of
persuasion required for a criminal conviction, whereas one would expect the
“preponderance of the evidence” to suﬃce for a regulatory penalty), and (c)
states of mind are relevant for criminal conviction but usually they do not
matter for imposing regulatory penalties.
An Agency imposes a penalty f and Courts impose a sanction s; total
wealth is S so that f +s  S. Penalty and sanction are both monetary ﬁnes
assumed to be costless to collect. For each detected and sanctioned oﬀender,
the Agency is paid a reward  by the Government.
Each potential oﬀender decides to become an oﬀender if b  p(m)f +
q(m)s. Let’s denote the expected sanction as z.
The Regulatory Agency is assumed to behave as a proﬁt-maximizing
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Πm = pm[1  G(z)]  p(m)g(z)zm  1 = 0
where the ﬁrst term is the marginal revenue from spending more on detection,
and the second term measures the marginal loss of more individuals being
deterred (reducing proﬁts).
Assuming the second-order condition is satisﬁed, it can be easily checked
that the optimal m is increasing in reward , and decreasing in the penalty
f and sanction s.
Social welfare is the sum of illegal gains minus social damage minus




(b  h)dG(b)  m
The social objective is to choose , f, and s to maximize the above
expression condition on the Agency’s choice of m (enforcement technology)




(b  h)dG(b)  m + (S  f  s)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
L = Wmm = 0 (1)
Lf = (h  z)g(z)p(m) + Wmmf    0 (2)
Ls = (h  z)g(z)q(m) + Wmms    0 (3)
where:
Wm = (h  z)g(z)(pmf + qms)  1 = 0 (4)
Second-order conditions are assumed to be satisﬁed. From (1), the re-
ward is set so that the Agency’s enforcement eﬀort m is socially optimal
(Wm = 0). By choosing the appropriate reward, the policymaker can dele-
gate the socially optimal enforcement eﬀort to a private Agency. Note that
9
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the harm.
Given the assumption that p(m) > q(m) for all m, the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions can only be satisﬁed by setting f = S and s = 0. The reasoning is
that, given socially optimal enforcement eﬀort m, it is more eﬀective to ﬁne
oﬀenders by the Regulatory Agency rather than by the Courts, because the
ﬁrst is less costly and entails a higher probability of eﬀective sanction for the
oﬀender, due to a lower burden of proof and disregard for mental states of
the oﬀender.
It is well known from Polinsky (1980) that sometimes it is not possible
to delegate the socially optimal m because is simply too high for the Agency.
Suppose complete deterrence is the socially optimal solution. The Agency’s
expected proﬁts are zero at this deterrence level. Thus, it will surely choose
enforcement eﬀort seeking less than socially optimal deterrence.
When the socially optimal eﬀort cannot be delegated, the Regulatory
Agency always chooses less than optimal enforcement eﬀort even if the reward
is very large (Wm > 0). Thus, the penalty to be imposed by the Agency could
be less than maximal because by lowering the sanction, the Agency is willing
to spend more on detection (recall that mf < 0). At the same time, the
criminal sanction is not necessarily positive for the same reason (i.e., we
have ms < 0).
From (2) and (4), given the assumption that p(m) > q(m) for all m, the
optimal policy will depend on the relationship between mf and ms. Using
the implicit function theorem, let us write:
mf  ms = (Πms  Πmf)=Πmm
= [pmg(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + p(m)g(z)(pm  qm)
+p(m)g
0(z)zm(p(m)  q(m))]=Πmm < 0
We have shown before that a regulatory penalty is more eﬀective in
deterring oﬀenders. Now we have shown that a regulatory penalty is more
eﬀective as an policy instrument to induce the Agency to increase detection
(recall that the Government wants the Agency to increase detection since
Wm > 0).
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pushes the regulatory penalty up, whereas the second pushes it down (so
that the Agency is willing to spend more on detection). Notice in (2) and
(3) that the ﬁrst term is positive whereas the second is negative generating
the possibility of interior solutions. There are three possibilities to consider:
(a) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm(mf  ms) > 0.
The ﬁrst term measures the relative value of the regulatory and criminal
ﬁnes in deterring oﬀenders. The second term measures the relative value of
these ﬁnes as policy instruments to induce the Agency to increase detection.
A regulatory penalty is still socially more desirable than a criminal sanc-
tion due to its advantage in terms of eﬃcient deterrence. From (2), the regu-
latory penalty could be less than maximal (to avoid under-enforcement), but
the criminal sanction should be zero.
(b) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm(mf  ms) < 0.
The criminal sanction is now socially more desirable than the regula-
tory penalty. The criminal sanction could be less than maximal (to avoid
under-enforcement), but the regulatory penalty should be zero. The role
of the penalty as an instrument to induce the Agency to increase detection
is so important that, notwithstanding its deterrence advantage, the optimal
regulatory penalty is zero.
(c) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm(mf  ms) = 0.
Both sanctions have the same social value. They are eventually less than
maximal (to avoid under-enforcement), and both sanctions could be positive,
so that 0 < f +s  S. The regulatory ﬁne goes down motivated by the need
to generate an appropriate incentive for the Agency to increase detection.
The criminal ﬁne could go up to oﬀset the eﬀect on deterrence.
In the rest of this paper we assume that the socially optimal enforce-
ment eﬀort can always be delegated (i.e., complete deterrence is not socially
optimal). In essence we are assuming that social damage h is not too high
for a given distribution of illegal gains. When social damage is high, given
the delegation problems, the policymaker should use non-proﬁt maximizing
11
11 Garoupa: Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal
Produced by bepress.com, 2011enforcers (what has been called in the literature “public enforcers”) rather
than Regulatory Agencies.12
3 Model with Imprisonment
Following Polinsky and Shavell (1984), suppose the criminal sanction s is the
monetary equivalent of an incarceration sentence or any other form of non-
monetary sanction. The social cost of imposing incarceration is C(s), where
C0 > 0 and C00 > 0. It includes the oﬀender’s cost of being incarcerated.




(b  h  qC(s))dG(b)  m
The social objective is to choose , f, and s to maximize the above
expression condition on the Agency’s choice of m (enforcement technology)




(b  h  qC(s))dG(b)  m + (S  f)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
L = Wmm = 0 (5)
Lf = (h + qC(s)  z)g(z)p(m) + Wmmf    0 (6)




0(:)dG(b) + Wmms  0 (7)
where:
Wm = (h + qC(s)  z)g(z)(pmf + qms) 
Z b
z
C(:)dG(b)  1 = 0 (8)
12See Polinsky (1980) and Garoupa and Klerman (2000) for a discussion about private
versus public (non-proﬁt maximizing) enforcement.
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reward is set so that the Agency’s enforcement eﬀort m is socially optimal
(Wm = 0). From (8), it is the case that z < h + qC(s), that is, the expected
sanction is less than the harm. From (6), the ﬁrst-order condition can only
be satisﬁed by setting f = S.
The ﬁrst term in (7) expresses the marginal gain from using incarceration
(the marginal value of increasing deterrence), and the second term in (7) is
the marginal cost from using incarceration. We can rearrange (7) into:
Ls = q(m)=p(m)  qC
0(:)(1  G(z))  0
The marginal gain from using incarceration increases with , the shadow
cost of the regulatory penalty. As wealth increases, the shadow cost of the
regulatory penalty decreases, and so does the marginal gain from using in-
carceration. Therefore, incarceration should be used when oﬀenders have
relatively fewer assets.
4 Model with Legal Error
So far we have considered Type II errors, that is, not punishing the guilty
(with probability (1  p(m))(1  q(m))). Suppose Type I errors, punishing
or convicting innocent individuals, could happen. Let us assume that the
probability of the Regulatory Agency convicting the innocent is p0(m), and
the probability of a Court convicting the innocent is q0(m). Whereas the
payoﬀ of an oﬀender is bp(m)f q(m)s as before, the payoﬀ of an innocent
is p0(m)f  q0(m)s where p(m)  p0(m) and q(m)  q0(m), that is, the
probability of convicting the guilty is higher than that of the innocent.
Denote (p(m)  p0(m))  (q(m)  q0(m)) by  (m). Even though we
assume p(m) > q(m) and p0(m) > q0(m), that is, it is more likely that the
Regulatory Agency will sanction (the guilty as much as the innocent) than
for the Courts, it is not necessarily true that p(m)q(m) > p0(m)q0(m) or
p(m)p0(m) > q(m)q0(m), i.e.  (m) can be positive or negative. Consider
an extreme example where p(m) = p0(m) = 1, q(m) = 1=2 and q0(m) = 0. It
is clear that the last inequality is not satisﬁed (  = 1=2).
13
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p(m)dG(b)  m (9)
where the ﬁrst term measures the revenues from convicting innocent individ-
uals.
The optimal m is decided by the Agency so that:
Πm = p
0
mG(z) + pm[1  G(z)]  (p(m)  p
0(m))g(z)zm  1 = 0 (10)
It can be easily checked that the comparative statics are the same as in the
basic model.




(b  h)dG(b)  m (11)
where for the present speciﬁcation a cost of miscarriage of justice is ignored.
In other words, legal error has no direct social cost; it only reduces deterrence.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
L = Wmm = 0 (12)
Lf = (h  z)g(z)[p(m)  p
0(m)] + Wmmf    0 (13)
Ls = (h  z)g(z)[q(m)  q
0(m)] + Wmms    0 (14)
where
Wm = (h  z)g(z)[(pm  p
0
m)f + (qm  q
0
m)s]  1 = 0 (15)
As before, second-order conditions are assumed to be satisﬁed, and the
Government uses  to delegate the socially optimal enforcement expenditure.
Compared with previous results, we will have f = S and s = 0 if
 (m) > 0, and s = S and f = 0 if  (m) < 0. If  (m) = 0, any f and s such
that f +s = S is optimal. The intuition is that the Agency is more eﬀective
14
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on deterrence is thus not straightforward. And this net eﬀect (as measured
by  (m)) decides the optimal policy.
Following Miceli (1991), let us include a cost of miscarriage of justice of
the form (p0(m)f + q0(m)s). Note that we assume that the social cost of
legal error is the same if caused by the Agency or by a Court of Law.13 The









0(m)s)dG(b)  m (16)
In this speciﬁcation, legal error has a social cost. It makes punishment so-
cially costly. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
L = Wmm = 0 (17)









0(m)) + Wmmf    0 (18)









0(m)) + Wmms    0 (19)
where
Wm = (h  z)g(z)[(pm  p
0














m)f + (qm  q
0
m)s]  1 = 0 (20)
Again, as before, second-order conditions are assumed to be satisﬁed
and the Government uses  to delegate the socially optimal enforcement
expenditure. From (18) and (19), we may have less than maximal ﬁnes
13We recognize that the cost of miscarriage is usually lower if an innocent is sanctioned
by the Regulatory Agency rather than by the Courts. We could consider s > f, but
the analytical conditions would be very similar to the ones we discuss below. See Kahan
(1997) and Posner (2000) for discussion.
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strictly increasing in the ﬁnes. As to optimal sanctioning, there are three
possibilities to be considered:









On the left-hand-side, we consider the relative deterrence eﬀect of both
ﬁnes. On the right-hand-side, we have the relative eﬀect of ﬁnes on the cost
of miscarriage of justice.
In this case, a regulatory penalty is socially more desirable than a crim-
inal sanction. From (18), the regulatory penalty could be less than maximal
(to avoid a high cost of miscarriage of justice), but the criminal sanction
should be zero. A regulatory penalty, notwithstanding its disadvantage in
terms of miscarriage of justice, is always more eﬃcient than a criminal sanc-
tion.









Under this condition, a regulatory penalty is socially less desirable than
a criminal sanction. From (19), the criminal sanction could be less than
maximal (to avoid a high cost of miscarriage of justice), but the regulatory
penalty should be zero. A criminal ﬁne is now always more eﬃcient than a
regulatory penalty due to its beneﬁcial eﬀect on avoiding legal error.
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than maximal (to avoid a high cost of miscarriage of justice )and both sanc-
tions could be positive, so that 0 < f + s  S. A possibility is that the
regulatory penalty goes down motivated by high cost of miscarriage of jus-
tice. The criminal sanction goes up for deterrence sake.
Note that when  = 0, there are only two possibilities: (a) and (b),
unless a particular case such that  (m) = 0 takes place (which would corre-
spond to (c)). The existence of a cost of miscarriage of justice increases the
likelihood of a regulatory penalty coexisting with a criminal sanction. The
intuition is that even though the Agency is still more eﬀective, the cost of
miscarriage increases more when using the Agency as the sanctioning body.
5 Model with Collusion
Consider the results obtained in the basic model. When the reward diﬀers
from the penalty, there is a possibility that the Regulatory Agency colludes
with oﬀenders, by form of bribing (if the penalty is higher than the reward)
or by form of fabricating oﬀenses (if the penalty is less than the reward). In
this section we will discuss in detail the case of bribing and make some brief
comments about fabrication of oﬀenses at the end of the section.
Let us assume that the penalty is higher than the reward. In other
words, it is assumed that the reward derived in section two (i.e., the reward
required to delegate the socially optimal enforcement eﬀort) is low. The
Agency and the oﬀender collude and the bribe is given by (f + )=2, where
each player has the same bargaining power. The expected sanction is now:
z = p(m)(f + )=2 + q(m)s




p(m)(f + )=2dG(b)  m
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Πm = pm(f + )=2[1  G(z)]  p(m)(f + )=2g(z)zm  1 = 0
Assuming the second-order condition is satisﬁed, it can be easily checked
that the optimal m is no longer monotonically increasing in reward , and
monotonically decreasing in the penalty f. The reason is that a higher reward
deters more oﬀenders (because the bribe is higher), and a ﬁne increases the
gain for the Agency (by generating a larger bribe).










(b  h)dG(b)  m + (S  f  s)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
L = (h  z)g(z)p(m)=2 + Wmm = 0 (21)
Lf = (h  z)g(z)p(m)=2 + Wmmf    0 (22)
Ls = (h  z)g(z)q(m) + Wmms    0 (23)
where:
Wm = (h  z)g(z)[pm(f + )=2 + qms]  1 = 0 (24)
Second-order conditions are assumed to be satisﬁed. From (21), the
reward is no longer set so that the Agency’s enforcement eﬀort m is socially
optimal (Wm = 0). The reason is that a higher reward is needed now because
it is a deterrence instrument (ﬁrst term in (21)). Recall that, in absence of
collusion, the reward is low. The consequence of a higher reward is that the
Agency’s enforcement eﬀort will be above the socially optimal (Wm < 0).
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criminal sanction. However, from (22), the same result does not hold for
the regulatory penalty. If mf > 0, that is, if enforcement increases with
the regulatory penalty (because it increases the bribe), the second term is
negative.
There are three possible situations:
(a) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)=2  q(m)) + Wm(mf  ms) > 0.
The ﬁrst term measures the relative value of these ﬁnes in deterring
oﬀenders. The second term measures the relative value of these ﬁnes as
policy instruments to induce the Agency to increase detection. The ﬁrst
term is not necessarily positive (because of collusion), and the sign of second
term depends on the parameters of the model. We know that Wm is negative,
but the sign of mf  ms could be positive or negative. In section two, we
have shown that mf  ms was negative, but now could be positive because
of bribing (recall that the regulatory penalty also plays the role of reward
now).
In order to satisfy this condition it must be case that at least one of the
following is true: p(m) > 2q(m) (a regulatory penalty is more eﬀective as a
deterrent than a criminal sanction when bribing takes place) or mf ms < 0
(a regulatory penalty is more eﬀective in controlling for over-enforcement
than a criminal sanction). A regulatory penalty is still socially more desirable
than a criminal sanction. The optimal policy is to set f = S and s = 0.
(b) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)=2  q(m)) + Wm(mf  ms) < 0.
In order to satisfy this condition it must be case that at least one of the
following is true: p(m) < 2q(m) (a criminal sanction is more eﬀective as a
deterrent than a regulatory penalty because of bribing) or mf  ms > 0 (a
criminal sanction is more eﬀective in controlling for over-enforcement than a
regulatory penalty). A criminal sanction is now socially more desirable than
a regulatory penalty. We could be tempted to argue that the optimal policy
should be f = 0 and s = S. However recall that we are assuming that f > .
So the optimal policy would be f =  +  and s = S    , where  is
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(c) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm(2mf  ms) = 0.
Both sanctions have the same social value. From (22), we could have
f < S (to avoid over-enforcement) and s = S  f (for deterrence sake).
Collusion diminishes deterrence. As a consequence, the Government
should increase the Agency’s reward so that the bribe increases. This policy
leads to over-enforcement. Thus, the Government may want to reduce the
regulatory penalty to reduce over-enforcement (if the relationship between
enforcement and regulatory penalty is positive). In order to oﬀset the eﬀect
on deterrence, a criminal sanction should be introduced.
5.1 Collusion-Proof Solution
From Becker and Stigler (1974), we should have  = f to eliminate incentives
for corruption. The reward collected by the Regulatory Agency should be
exactly equal to the penalty paid by the detected oﬀender to generate a
collusion-proof solution.15 This rule of course constraints the optimization
problem, and social welfare will be necessarily lower than in section two
(unless for some pure coincidence  = S in section two).
The social objective is now to choose f and s to maximize social wel-
fare condition on the Agency’s choice of m (enforcement technology), on
total wealth, and on the reward being equal to the penalty imposed by the
Regulatory Agency.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
Lf = (h  z)g(z)p(m) + Wm(mf + m)    0 (25)
Ls = (h  z)g(z)q(m) + Wmms    0 (26)
14Note that when  = 0, collusion is eliminated. It introduces a discontinuity in the
objective function. This solution is analyzed in the next subsection.
15See Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) for discussion. A
collusion-proof solution is the optimal solution if the objective of the government is to
completely eliminate corruption.
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The reward is no longer optimal because it must equal the regulatory
penalty to generate a collusion-proof solution. If optimal  is less than S,
the reward will have to go up and the sanction will have to go down. Thus,
Wm will be negative meaning that too much is spent on detection (over-
enforcement).
From (26), the ﬁrst and the second term are positive, so that social
welfare is increasing in the criminal sanction. From (25), the ﬁrst term
is positive, but the second term could be negative. Social welfare is not
necessarily increasing in the regulatory penalty.
In order to evaluate policies, let us start by writing:
 = mf + m  ms = (Πms  Πmf  Πm)=Πmm
= [pmg(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + p(m)g(z)(pm  qm)
+p(m)g
0(z)zm(p(m)  q(m))  pm(1  G(z)) + pmg(z)zm]=Πmm
It is the case that  could be negative or positive. We also know from
section two that mf  ms is negative. If we have a positive , the eﬀect
of the reward on enforcement (m) more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of ﬁnes on
enforcement (mf ms). Conversely, if negative, the eﬀect of ﬁnes more than
oﬀsets the reward eﬀect on Agency’s enforcement eﬀort.
It has been assumed that the regulatory penalty is more eﬀective in de-
terring oﬀenders. We also know that the regulatory penalty aﬀects collusion,
whereas the criminal sanction has no bearing on the bargaining between the
Regulatory Agency and an oﬀender. These two eﬀects have diﬀerent policy
implications. The ﬁrst eﬀect pushes the regulatory penalty up for deterrence
sake, whereas the second pushes it down to eliminate collusion.
There are three possibilities to consider:
(a) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm > 0.
Notice the ﬁrst term is positive and measures the relative value of both
ﬁnes in deterring oﬀenders. The second term measures the relative value of
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(given elimination of bribing) and its sign depends on .
A regulatory penalty is socially more valuable than a criminal sanction.
The regulatory penalty must be maximal, and the criminal sanction is zero.
(b) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm < 0.
It must be the case that  is positive, that is, the eﬀect of the reward
on enforcement (m) more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of ﬁnes on enforcement
(mf  ms).
A regulatory penalty is socially less valuable than a criminal sanction.
From (26), the criminal sanction is maximal, but the regulatory penalty is
zero. The elimination of bribing is so important that the regulatory penalty
goes to zero, and a criminal sanction is introduced because of deterrence
considerations.
It is not a likely outcome since the Agency’s choice of enforcement is
zero (because the reward is zero).
(c) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm = 0.
Again we must have  > 0. Both sanctions are less than maximal (to
avoid over-enforcement) and both sanctions are positive, so that 0 < f +s 
S. The regulatory penalty goes down motivated by the need to eliminate
bribing. The criminal ﬁne goes up to oﬀset the eﬀect on deterrence.
5.2 Fabrication of oﬀenses
Fabrication of oﬀenses is a problem when the optimal reward  is higher than
S. In order to eliminate fabrication of oﬀenses, the reward will have to go
down until it equals S (since the regulatory penalty cannot go up). Thus
Wm will be positive meaning that too little is spent on detection (we have
under-enforcement).
From (26), the ﬁrst is positive and the second term is negative, so that
social welfare is not necessarily increasing in the criminal sanction. There
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(a) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm > 0.
A regulatory penalty is socially more valuable than a criminal sanc-
tion. The regulatory penalty could be less than maximal (to avoid under-
enforcement), but the criminal sanction should be zero.
(b) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm < 0.
It must be the case that  is negative, that is, the eﬀect of the reward on
enforcement (m) does not oﬀset the eﬀect of ﬁnes on enforcement (mfms).
A regulatory penalty is socially less valuable than a criminal sanction.
From (26), the criminal sanction could be less than maximal (to avoid under-
enforcement), but the regulatory penalty should be zero. The elimination of
fabrication is so important that the regulatory penalty (and the Agency’s
reward) goes to zero, and a criminal sanction is introduced because of deter-
rence considerations.
It is not a likely outcome since the Agency’s choice of enforcement is
zero (because the reward is zero).
(c) (h  z)g(z)(p(m)  q(m)) + Wm = 0.
Again we must have  < 0. Both sanctions are less than maximal (to
avoid under-enforcement) and both sanctions are positive, so that 0 < f+s 
S. The regulatory penalty goes down motivated by the need to eliminate
fabrication. The criminal ﬁne goes up to oﬀset the eﬀect on deterrence.
5.3 Monitoring the Regulatory Agency
In our model with bribing we have so far ignored the possibility of using Court
cases to investigate collusion between the Regulatory Agency and oﬀenders.
When the Agency and an oﬀender collude, there is still a probability q(m)
that the oﬀender will be subjected to criminal penalties. Suppose that if
oﬀender is found guilty in Court, the Agency’s behavior will be investigated
by the Government and will be punished with a ﬁne t.
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there is a probability q of criminal prosecution. However, the Agency wants
a bribe that covers the reward  plus the expected ﬁne if criminal charges are
brought (say with probability r(m)  q(m)). As long as t  (f  )=r(m),
the Agency is deterred from accepting bribes.
The policy for the Government would be to announce a reward to induce
the Agency to choose the socially optimal monitoring eﬀort coupled with a
high sanction if collusion is detected plus a maximal regulatory ﬁne and no
criminal penalty.
Criminal prosecution of an oﬀender is useful as a mechanism to generate
information to punish the Regulatory Agency for collusion, rather than to
punish an oﬀender. There could be a credibility problem with this solution
of course: if the criminal sanction for an oﬀender is zero, the Agency could
perceive such announcement as Courts not getting involved, and thus t to
be actually zero. Thus, the Government could have to use a low criminal
sanction for an oﬀender to signal de possibility of punishing the Agency. At
the same time, the regulatory penalty would be the maximal ﬁne minus the
low criminal sanction.
A second problem with this policy is that the sanction borne by the
Agency is limited by a wealth constraint, eventually the personal wealth of
the enforcer. Denote the (exogenous) wealth of the enforcer by T. The
sanction borne by the Agency should be t = T for the usual motives, and
we would have a collusion-proof solution by imposing f =  + r(m)T. As
T increases, we can enlarge the gap between f and  (the problem of over-
enforcement is reduced) without generating an incentive for collusion.
6 Concluding remarks
The analysis of the use of regulatory penalties and criminal sanctions pre-
sented in the preceding sections of the paper, allows us to draw some policy
implications, both for an optimal law-enforcement policy and for the scope
of the Double Jeopardy clause.
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When, for some kind of misbehavior or illegal activity, the socially optimal
level of deterrence can be delegated to a Regulatory Agency, to give the
Agency authority to impose penalties on the oﬀenders is the more eﬀective
deterrence strategy for the Government. Moreover, if none of the qualifying
circumstances listed below are present, there is no need to supplement the
regulatory penalty with a speciﬁc criminal provision intended to sanction
the same underlying illegal behavior.16 However, when any of the following
factors is an issue, it might be socially advisable to introduce related criminal
sanctions for the relevant misbehavior.
(a) The potential oﬀender might have insuﬃcient assets to meet the desired
regulatory penalty. And given that, for constitutional reasons, only Courts
of Law following a criminal conviction can impose punishment in the form of
incarceration or other type of deprivation of liberty, deterrence requires the
use of criminal provisions contemplating non-monetary sanctions.
(b) Even when a Regulatory Agency is operating and has sanctioning powers
in a certain ﬁeld, there might be cases of violations for which the optimal level
of deterrence cannot be delegated to the Agency (e.g. when complete deter-
rence is optimal). This might justify supplementing the regulatory penalty
with a criminal sanction. When the regulatory penalty is more eﬀective in
controlling for under-deterrence, we might want reduce it in order to pro-
vide appropriate incentives to increase enforcement eﬀort, but this requires
a criminal sanction to maintain the level of deterrence.
(c) Legal decision-makers sometimes err in their judgements and sanction an
innocent individual or ﬁrm - Type I error -. Although this kind of legal error
is likely to aﬀect both Regulatory Agencies and Courts, the probability of
its occurrence seems higher for the former than for the latter. As a matter
of fact, one can argue that the primary - albeit not exclusive - goal of the
criminal trial is precisely to reduce Type I errors.
16Our claim does not imply advocating that, because a certain regulatory violation (envi-
ronmental, for instance) might result in death of a person, we should abolish manslaughter
or murder from the Criminal Codes. We are referring here to speciﬁc statutory crimes,
directed at punishing the regulatory violation as such.
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(c1) If there are no costs associated with error other than the erosion of
deterrence, our model does not reveal good reasons for the combined use of
regulatory penalties and criminal sanctions: It is socially desirable to have
only the regulatory penalty when it has a more important deterrent eﬀect
than a criminal sanction. If the reverse is true, we don’t want a combination
of both sanctions, but only the criminal conviction.
(c2) If, on the contrary, there are costs arising out of sanctioning the inno-
cent (loss of well-gained reputation by a ﬁrm, ostracism on the sanctioned
individual, demoralization of the citizenship), and the diﬀerence in cost of
legal error is not so big as to always oﬀset the deterrent advantage of using a
regulatory penalty -because in this case we only desire the criminal sanction-,
then we might want to reduce the regulatory penalty to decrease the expected
cost of legal error . The optimal strategy to maintain deterrence is through
an increase in the criminal sanction.
It seems unlikely to us that in the real world legal error will justify
the combination of both types of sanctions in many circumstances, due to
the fact that the size of the cost of miscarriage of justice will probably be
higher for the criminal conviction -more shame associated with it, even if it
is only monetary and aﬀects a ﬁrm-, and often much higher -stigma linked
to imprisonment when the criminal conviction leads to incarceration-.
(d) When the size of the reward for the Agency does not coincide with the
size of the penalty the oﬀender faces if detected, there is ample room for
collusive dealing between the two of them. In other words, when corruption
is an issue, our main result might be substantially altered
(d1) When the Agency’s reward is collusion-proof, under certain conditions,
we want a combination of sanctions because: optimal reward is less than the
entire wealth , and then to achieve a collusion proof reward we need to in-
crease reward and/or reduce sanction, which implies an increase in the level of
enforcement, so that we have excessive enforcement eﬀort (over-enforcement).
Then, to reduce it and maintain deterrence, it is socially desirable to have a
criminal sanction.
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between the Agency and oﬀenders. A criminal sanction is socially desirable
to oﬀset dilution of deterrence.
6.2 For the scope of Double Jeopardy Protection
In our setting, Double Jeopardy becomes an issue when, in fact, a given
statutory violation might result both in regulatory penalties and criminal
sanctions. When only one or the other is forthcoming as the expected sanc-
tion, life, limb and assets can be put in jeopardy just once, and the scope of
the Double Jeopardy clause is of no relevance. The ﬁndings of our model tend
to support an interpretation of the Double Jeopardy clause as giving protec-
tion against double punishment be it in the form of a regulatory penalty or
a criminal sanction. So, contrary to what is currently the position of the US
Supreme Court17, our claim is that, absent any qualifying factors, once a reg-
ulatory penalty has been imposed, an additional criminal conviction should
be barred, and vice-versa. Moreover, our model allows us to identify several
factors aﬀecting the preference for one or the other type of sanction.18
In principle, regulatory penalties seem to be more eﬀective for deterrence
and should be preferred. The opposite holds when (a) Optimal enforcement
cannot be delegated to the Agency, and the advantage of using a criminal
sanction with regard to the level of under-enforcement exceeds the compar-
ative advantage of a regulatory penalty with respect to eﬀectiveness, (b)
There is a signiﬁcant chance of legal error, and the advantage of the criminal
trial in preventing it exceeds the diﬀerence in eﬀectiveness, (c) When there
is the possibility of corruption, but the Government has set a collusion-proof
reward, the criminal sanction is preferred over a regulatory penalty if the
relative advantage of the former in reducing over-enforcement by the Agency
17Hudson v. US (1997).
18To our knowledge, in the US the Double Jeopardy clause does not play a role in
deciding which type of sanction should prevail. It only protects the oﬀender against
multiple punishments. In several European legal systems, on the contrary, the Non bis
in idem principle, under the somewhat misleading heading of procedural Non bis in idem,
awards preference to the criminal sanction. In the world of our model, it is clear that this
unqualiﬁed and general preference for the criminal conviction makes no sense.
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terrence, (d) When the issue is fabrication of oﬀenses, and the Government
has to reduce the reward, the criminal sanction is preferred over regulatory
enforcement when the relative advantage of the former regarding enforcement
more than oﬀsets the deterrence superiority of the latter.
The analysis presented in the paper, however, should not be interpreted
as an unqualiﬁed defense of a broad - as long as it includes sanctions that
are non-criminal in nature - interpretation of the Double Jeopardy clause.
It is important to keep in mind that there are circumstances in which it
is sensible to impose both sets of sanctions, and therefore, to deny Double
Jeopardy protection:
(a) If the optimal regulatory penalty exceeds the wealth constraint of the
oﬀender, imprisonment following a criminal conviction should be allowed.
(b) When there is likelihood of legal error, and it will be costly in social
terms, it is sensible to reduce the regulatory penalty and have a criminal
sanction (which is more reliable in terms of error and, in a setting of purely
monetary sanctions, might be not much more costly in terms of miscarriage
of justice). The Court could then reduce the regulatory penalty and, if
decides conviction, impose the criminal sanction. Contrary to the standard
legal reasoning19, the shamefulness of the regulatory penalty ceteris paribus
weights in favor - because it increases the cost of miscarriage of justice for
the regulatory penalty - and not against allowing the double sanction,
(c) When there is room for collusion, the regulatory penalty is too low (either
because there is bribing or because this is the way to eliminate the possibility
of collusion), and a criminal sanction should be used to maintain deterrence.
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